Preface -- Chapter 1: The Ownership of the Firm -- 1.1: A Story of Robin Hood -- 1.2: Power, Entrepreneur, and Objectives of the Firm -- 1.3: Choice, Risk Attitude, and Types of Contract -- References -- Chapter 2: Maximizing Profits and Maximizing Resource Providers’ Wealth -- 2.1: The Coase Theorem and the Modigliani-Miller Propositions -- 2.2: A Simple Example of the Modigliani-Miller Second Proposition -- References -- Chapter 3: A Reconsideration of the Modigliani-Miller Propositions -- 3.1: A Tale of Two Cows-The Modigliani-Miller First Proposition -- 3.2: Some Fallacious Arguments for the Modigliani-Miller Second Proposition -- References -- Chapter 4: Derivatives and the Theory of the Firm -- 4.1: Model-Free Option Prices -- 4.2: The Firm’s Resources and Derivatives -- 4.2.1: Each Resource Is Both a European Call Option and a European Put Option -- 4.2.2: Each Resource Is a Stock Plus a Forward Contract -- References -- Chapter 5: Arbitrage and Valuation of Different Contracts -- 5.1: The Arbitrage Theorem -- 5.2: Properties of the Binomial Option Pricing Model -- 5.3: Valuing Different Contracts -- Appendix A: Incomplete Market -- Appendix B: Incomplete Market and Replication of Securities -- Appendix C: More Uncertain Project and the Firm’s Value -- References -- Chapter 6: Misinterpretations of Residual Claim in Finance and Corporate Law -- 6.1: De Jure versus De Facto -- 6.2: Agency Costs and Residual Claim -- 6.3: Moral Hazard and Residual Claim -- References -- Index.