1. Introduction -- 1.1 Embracing wireless interference -- 1.1.1 Decoding 802.11 collisions -- 1.1.2 Combating high-power cross-technology interference -- 1.1.3 Non-invasive approach to securing medical implants -- 1.1.4 Secure pairing without passwords or prior secrets -- 1.2 Organization --

2. Decoding 802.11 collisions -- 2.1 Related work -- 2.2 Scope -- 2.3 A communication primer -- 2.3.1 Practical issues -- 2.4 ZigZag decoding -- 2.4.1 Is it a collision? -- 2.4.2 Did the AP receive two matching collisions? -- 2.4.3 How does the AP decode matching collisions? -- 2.4.4 Estimating and tracking system parameters -- 2.5 Dealing with errors -- 2.6 Backward compatibility -- 2.7 Beyond two interferers -- 2.8 Complexity -- 2.9 Experimental environment -- 2.9.1 Setup -- 2.9.2 Micro-evaluation -- 2.9.3 Does ZigZag work -- 2.9.4 The impact of the SNR -- 2.9.5 Testbed throughput and loss rate -- 2.9.6 Many hidden terminals -- 2.10 Discussion --

3. Combating high-power cross-technology interference -- 3.1 Impact of cross-technology interference on 802.11n -- 3.1.1 Digital cordless phone -- 3.1.2 Baby monitor -- 3.1.3 Microwave ovens -- 3.1.4 Frequency hopping bluetooth -- 3.1.5 Summary -- 3.2 MIMO and OFDM background -- 3.3 Problem domain -- 3.4 TIMO -- 3.5 Decoding in the presence of cross-technology interference -- 3.5.1 Computing the interferer's channel ratio -- 3.5.2 Decoding the signal of interest -- 3.5.3 Iterating to increase accuracy -- 3.5.4 Estimating the 802.11n channel functions -- 3.5.5 Finding the interference boundaries -- 3.5.6 Putting it together -- 3.5.7 Complexity -- 3.6 Ensuring the interferer can decode -- 3.7 Implementation -- 3.8 Performance evaluation -- 3.8.1 Cordless phone -- 3.8.2 Baby monitor -- 3.8.3 Microwave oven -- 3.8.4 Multiple interferers -- 3.9 Micro benchmarks -- 3.10 Related work -- 3.11 Discussion --

4. Non-invasive approach to securing medical implants -- 4.1 IMD communication primer -- 4.2 Assumptions and threat model -- 4.2.1 Assumptions -- 4.2.2 Threat model -- 4.3 System overview -- 4.4 Jammer-cum-receiver -- 4.5 Protecting against passive eavesdroppers -- 4.6 Protecting against active adversaries -- 4.7 Implementation -- 4.8 Testing environment -- 4.9 Evaluation -- 4.9.1 Micro-benchmark results -- 4.9.2 Protecting from passive adversaries -- 4.9.3 Protecting from active adversaries -- 4.10 Coexistence -- 4.11 Related work -- 4.12 Discussion --

5. Secure pairing without passwords or prior secrets -- 5.1 Related work -- 5.2 PBC and 802.11 background -- 5.2.1 Push button configuration -- 5.2.2 802.11 -- 5.3 Security model -- 5.3.1 Threat model -- 5.3.2 Security guarantees -- 5.4 TEP design -- 5.4.1 Tamper-evident message (TEM) -- 5.4.2 Securing PBC using TEM -- 5.4.3 Example scenarios -- 5.4.4 Making pairing faster -- 5.5 TEM on off-the-shelf hardware -- 5.5.1 Scheduling slot transmission -- 5.5.2 Energy detection at the receiver -- 5.5.3 Sending a synchronization packet -- 5.5.4 Checking for TEM while transmitting -- 5.6 Evaluation -- 5.6.1 Evaluating TEP's security -- 5.6.2 Evaluating TEP's accuracy -- 5.6.3 Evaluating TEP's performance -- 5.6.4 Performance with non-802.11 traffic -- 5.7 Discussion --

6. Conclusion -- 6.1 Looking forward -- Bibliography -- Author's biography.