Domain Conditions and Social Rationality
tarafından
 
Jain, Satish Kumar. author.

Başlık
Domain Conditions and Social Rationality

Yazar
Jain, Satish Kumar. author.

ISBN
9789811396724

Yazar
Jain, Satish Kumar. author.

Edisyon
1st ed. 2019.

Fiziksel Niteleme
XIX, 193 p. online resource.

İçindekiler
Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. The Preliminaries -- Chapter 3. The Method of Majority Decision -- Chapter 4. The Strict Majority Rule -- Chapter 5. The Class of Semi-Strict Majority Rules -- Chapter 6. Special Majority Rules -- Chapter 7. The Class of Strict Majority Rules -- Chapter 8. The Class of Pareto-Inclusive Strict Majority Rules -- Chapter 9. Social Decision Rules Which Are Simple Games -- Chapter 10. Neutral and Monotonic Binary Social Decision Rules -- Chapter 11. Quasi-Transitive Individual Preferences -- Chapter 12. Summary and Concluding Remarks.

Özet
This book primarily focuses on the domain conditions under which a number of important classes of binary social decision rules give rise to rational social preferences. One implication of the Arrow and Gibbard theorems is that every non-oligarchic social decision rule that satisfies the condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives, a requirement crucial for the unambiguity of social choices, and the weak Pareto criterion fails to generate quasi-transitive social preferences for some configurations of individual preferences. The problem is exemplified by the famous voting paradox associated with the majority rule. Thus, in the context of rules that do not give rise to transitive (quasi-transitive) social preferences for every configuration of individual preferences, an important problem is that of formulating Inada-type necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity (quasi-transitivity). This book formulates conditions for transitivity and quasi-transitivity for several classes of social decision rules, including majority rules, non-minority rules, Pareto-inclusive non-minority rules, and social decision rules that are simple games. It also analyzes in detail the conditions for transitivity and quasi-transitivity under the method of the majority decision, and derives the maximally sufficient conditions for transitivity under the class of neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules and one of its subclasses. The book also presents characterizations of some of the classes of rules for which domain conditions have been derived. The material covered is relevant to anyone interested in studying the structure of voting rules, particularly those interested in social choice theory. Providing the necessary social choice theoretic concepts, definitions, propositions and theorems, the book is essentially self-contained. The treatment throughout is rigorous, and unlike most of the literature on domain conditions, care is taken regarding the number of individuals in the 'necessity' proofs. As such it is an invaluable resource for students of economics and political science, with takeaways for everyone – from first-year postgraduates to more advanced doctoral students and scholars.

Konu Başlığı
Game theory.
 
Economic theory.
 
Welfare economics.
 
Economic policy.
 
Economics.
 
Sociology.
 
Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences. https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/M13011
 
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods. https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/W29000
 
Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice/Political Economy. https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/W31020
 
Political Economy/Economic Systems. https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/W46000
 
Sociological Theory. https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/X22060

Ek Kurum Yazar
SpringerLink (Online service)

Elektronik Erişim
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9672-4


Materyal TürüBarkodYer NumarasıDurumu/İade Tarihi
Electronic Book428533-1001HB144Springer E-Book Collection